The Argument from Disagreement
The argument from disagreement is the argument that the fact of moral disagreement implies moral relativism. If we look at the world around us, we find that different people and cultures have different, in some cases radically different, moral codes.
If there were one true morality then we would not expect to find this; rather, we would expect to find people in agreement, and a cross-cultural consensus on moral matters. The fact of moral disagreement thus implies that morality is a product of personal opinion or culture, that there is no one true morality.
Moral Disagreement is Exaggerated
One response to the argument from disagreement is to play down the extent of the moral disagreement in the world. There is, of course, some disagreement between cultures on moral matters, but what is really striking is not the extent of the disagreement but the extent of the agreement. The moral value of compassion, of mutual respect and assistance, have been almost universally recognised. Moral disagreement is not as great as we would expect it to be if there were no objective moral truths; in fact, there is enough of a cross-cultural consensus to suggest that there is some universal standard to which all people have access irrespective of their cultural background.
Disagreement Does Not Imply Relativism
Perhaps a more conclusive criticism of the argument from disagreement is the criticism that disagreement does not imply relativism. The argument from disagreement rests on the principle that disagreement implies relativism; it assumes that because different cultures disagree about morality, morality is merely a product of culture. There are many questions, however, about which there is widespread disagreement, but to which there are certainly objectively true answers.
For example, there was a time when the majority of people believed that the Earth is flat. As the scientific data came in, majority opinion changed, and we now know that the Earth is a sphere. There must, however, have been a time when opinion was divided on the subject, when an equal number of people adhered to each position.
This disagreement could have been used to argue that the shape of the Earth is a relative matter, that it is flat for those that believe that it is flat, and spherical for those that believe that it is spherical. Surely, it could have been argued, if the shape of the Earth were an objective matter then people would agree about it; disagreement implies relativism.
This argument would clearly have been flawed; disagreement does not imply relativism. If, though, disagreement does not imply relativism in the case of the shape of the Earth, then surely disagreement does not imply relativism in the case of morality. If it is possible for there to be widespread disagreement on questions to which there is an objective answer, then widespread disagreement on moral questions does not demonstrate that moral questions do not have objective answers.
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