The Argument from Flexibility
The argument from flexibility is the argument that it is only moral relativism that can explain why different people in different situations have different moral duties.
For any proposed moral rule (e.g. don’t kill, or don’t steal), there appear to be exceptions. Killing in self-defense, or theft in order to feed one’s starving family, are perhaps accepted. The dogmatic view that there are absolute moral rules therefore seems to be too simplistic; we should accept that morality varies depending on circumstances, that it is relative.
This Rests on an Over-Simplification of Morality
A natural response to this argument is to object that it rests on an oversimplification of morality. Yes, there are exceptions to the prohibitions on killing and stealing, but that does not show that there are no exceptionless moral laws; rather, it only shows that those particular laws have exceptions.
Suppose that an absolute prohibition on killing is proposed as a moral law: “Thou shalt not kill.” The argument from flexibility objects to this proposal, observing that in certain situations, for example, self-defense, or war, or euthanasia, killing is morally acceptable. It is naive to think that there are any moral absolutes, it suggests; life is more complicated than that. To recognise this, we should become moral relativists, accepting that morality changes to fit the circumstances.
The moral objectivist, however, can respond, saying that the moral relativist’s characterisation of moral objectivism is an oversimplification. Moral objectivists don’t hold that everyone ought to behave in precisely the same way irrespective of their circumstances. Rather, moral objectivists hold that everyone in relevantly similar situations has the same moral obligations. Who you are doesn’t make a difference to morality; morality treats everyone equally.
An absolute prohibition on killing may well not apply to everyone. Perhaps people defending themselves, or fighting a war, or acting in the best interests of a suffering relative, can sometimes be justified in killing. But the mere fact that “killing is wrong” does not always apply does not show that there is no rule that always applies. Why not modify the proposed rule to accommodate the exceptions to it; “thou shalt not kill” might become “thou shalt not kill except in self-defence”, for example.
If there are further exceptions to this moral rule, then the rule can be modified again. Eventually, when all of the exceptions have been written into the rules, we will have exceptionless moral rules, rules that apply to all people in all circumstances. These will be the absolute moral laws the existence of which moral relativism denies.
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