The Argument from Tolerance
The argument from tolerance attempts to establish that moral relativism is true on the basis that the alternative--moral absolutism--is intolerant.
We ought to be tolerant, the argument runs, but to morally criticise other cultures or individuals is intolerant. We should therefore recognise that moral criticism of others is inappropriate; we should become moral relativists.
The Argument is Inconsistent
The first problem with the argument from intolerance is that it is inconsistent.
On the one hand, it argues that there are no objective moral standards, that morality is a cultural or personal matter.
On the other hand, it repeatedly asserts objective moral claims: “we ought to be tolerant”, “we should recognise that moral criticism of others is inappropriate”, “we should become moral relativists”.
If moral relativism is true, then each of these claims is false; there is no objective duty to be tolerant.
If there is no objective duty to be tolerant, though, then how does the fact (if it is a fact) that tolerance requires relativism bear on the question of whether we should be relativists?
Moral Criticism is not Always Inappropriate
A second difficulty with the argument is that there are some occasions on which intolerance does appear to be appropriate.
If someone tries to steal your car, then you have every right to criticise them; you don’t have to stand back thinking that different people have different standards and that what’s wrong for you might be right for them.
A simple appeal to tolerance as a reason to be a relativist is therefore too simple; tolerance isn’t always a virtue.
Relativism is not Necessary for Tolerance
A further problem is that it is possible to be tolerant without being a relativist. What does it mean to be intolerant? What would count as intolerance towards someone with whom you disagree?
Certainly hurling abuse is intolerant, as is physical violence. It is much less clear, however, that believing that someone is mistaken is intolerant. Tolerance, plausibly, involves treating people with respect; it is not a matter of what one believes but rather of how one behaves.
One can believe that a person’s views are false, however, but treat them with respect anyway. It is therefore not necessary to be a moral relativist in order to be tolerant.
Tolerance is Only Possible for Objectivists
This point can be developed: not only is it possible for moral objectivists to be tolerant, it is actually impossible for moral relativists to be tolerant. This is because it makes no sense to talk of tolerating the views of those with whom we agree.
To be tolerant is to treat with respect those with whom one disagrees; tolerance requires disagreement. The relativist view that every diverse perspective is equally valid and should be recognised as such therefore not only fails to promote tolerance but even makes tolerance impossible.
If we accept that everyone is right, that every perspective is true, then we are not being tolerant. To be tolerant we must judge the views of others to be false, and then treat them with respect anyway.
We can only judge the view of others to be false, however, if we are moral objectivists. If anything, then, the virtue of tolerance supports moral objectivism, not moral relativism.
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