Moral Progress
Not only does moral relativism entail that we cannot make legitimate moral comparisons of different cultures, it also entails that we cannot make legitimate moral comparisons of a single culture across time; we cannot judge whether a changing society is getting better or worse. Generally, though, we do think that we have made moral progress. Moral relativism, arguably, cannot make sense of this.
We have progressed from a society in which some groups have faced discrimination on grounds of sex, race, class, or disability, to one in which there is greater equality. We still have a long way to go on these issues, but we have made progress; we are better than we were.
Moral relativism makes it difficult to make such judgements as these. In the past, when our values were different, discriminatory bahaviour was consistent with those values. If we judge the two periods of our society using those past values, then there has arguably been a moral decline; we now treat unequal groups as if they were equal. If we judge the two periods of our society using our present values, then there has been progress. There is no way, though, for the moral relativist to say that either of these judgements is objectively better than the other. To do that we would need an objective standard, and moral relativism denies that there is any such thing.
The relativist might reply to this by saying that there is an objective standard that is consistent with moral relativism: each period is to be judged by how well it meets its own standards. Goodness consists in fulfilling whatever duties one has, and though duties may vary between periods and cultures, whether a given group of people acts in ways consistent with its own standards is an objective matter. Comparisons between groups are therefore possible.
This, though, raises two difficulties. First, it implies that we have not made moral progress, but rather have suffered a moral decline. In the past, when our values allowed for discrimination, and we discriminated, we were at least acting in ways that were consistent with our values; we were acting well. Now, when our values do not allow for discimination, but we continue to discriminate to some extent, we are not acting in ways that are consistent with our values; we are acting badly. What seems to be moral progress, then, is seen by moral relativism as moral decline.
Second, it implies that faced we a society like our own in which values and behaviour do not match, there are two ways that we can make things morally better: we can either change the behaviour to match the standards, or we can change the standards to match the behaviour. If moral relativism is correct, then we can solve the lingering problems that we have with discrimination by not by ceasing discrimination, but by restoring the values according to which discrimination is deemed to be acceptable. That, though, can’t be right. Moral relativism, then, to the extent that it can account for moral progress, makes a mockery of it.
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